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which is after all the important thing, had been increased and the purely narrative material reduced.

After an introductory essay on the Greek myths (pp. xli-lx), in which he is at his best, the author divides his work into three parts: I, "Myths of the Beginning, the Heroes and the Afterworld"; II, "The Greek Gods"; III, "The Mythology of Ancient Italy." This arrangement of the material is logical and economical. The stories of the local heroes clear the way for the accounts of the gods and make them more intelligible.

Of the 328 pages in the book proper 307 are devoted to Greek, 21 to Roman, mythology. Moreover, much of the material included in the Roman section falls under the head of religion rather than of mythology. Undoubtedly, the store of Roman mythology is much smaller than that of Greek, but the difference is not so great as is indicated by these figures. Not only more Roman myths should have been treated, but some of the subjects touched on merited fuller discussion—for example, the cult of Diana on page 294 and that of Fortuna on page 295. There is in fact in the Roman section a lack of the genial sympathy that makes the discussion of the Greek myths such good reading. Yet the history of Roman religious thought, as it developed in the successive stages of indigenous pandemonism, of Etruscan, Greek, and oriental influence, furnishes a vast amount of material of first importance for a series, the aim of which is to clarify our knowledge of religious consciousness.

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COE'S PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION

Investigators of the psychology of religion have been equipped in such different ways and have had their attention upon such different aspects of the subject that there has long been need of some survey and report of the work as a whole. Professor Coe's present volume¹ is planned to meet this need; in his own words, the book is "intended primarily as a handbook for beginners in the psychological analysis of religion"; and it has as its foremost concern "to make clear the nature of the problems, the kind of data, the methods of research, and the achieved results." This purpose has been excellently attained, having

¹ *The Psychology of Religion*. By George Albert Coe. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1916. xvii+365 pages. \$1.50.

brought us a clear and scholarly account of the work, wherein justice is shown even to those contributors toward whose methods or conclusions the author's heart least warms.

In recounting the ways in which the data are gathered for the psychological study of religion, he well indicates the safe stretches and the pitfalls in the path of one who relies upon the questionnaire, the religious biography, the sacred Scripture, and other records, or upon the methods of anthropology or psychological experiment. As for religion itself, Professor Coe finds its origin in the action of groups of men concerned with the supply of food, with war, with initiation into tribal lore and custom, and with sex; and where religion is intimately conjoined with totem, *mana*, taboo, magic, spiritism, myth, and fetish. In so far as there is an attempt to complete, unify, and conserve recognized values, we find here religion.

From these beginnings there come the various religions, whose differences are traceable to differences of geography, of economic life, of social and political organization, of culture which takes the form of philosophy, science, and art. Professor Coe views as important here the effect also of religious institutions, of religious leaders, and of the interaction of peoples.

He next indicates the significance, for the development of religion, of the crowd, the priesthood, and the deliberative body, in which the individual appears, respectively, as impulsive, as regulated, and as self-emancipating. An account in some detail is given of conversion and of certain classes of religious leaders ranging from shamans through priests to prophets.

Professor Coe does not find the focus of religion in our subconscious life; he says, rather, that "religious experience tends to focalize itself where individuality is most pronounced, not at its obscure outer edges; where self-control is at its maximum, not its minimum; where the issues are those of a society as a deliberative (or potentially deliberative) body." Thus religion is personal and social; it cannot, as science often is, be contented with an abstract world, something apart from personal relations; indeed science never can supplant religion. Religion ever presses on to a fuller recognition of persons. The culminating expression of religion, for Professor Coe, is found in fellowship with a Divine Being. "The thought of God may, indeed, undergo many transformations," he says, "but in one form or another it will be continually renewed as an expression of the depth and the height of social experience and social aspiration."

The volume throughout is of admirable moderation and balance. He would have religion intelligent, but will not grant that it has its very seat and center in the intellect. Rather the seat and center is in the activity of appreciation, in valuation. Professor Coe regards religion "as an imminent movement within our valuations, a movement that does not terminate in any single set of thought contents or in any set of particular values." The most significant mark of religion is thus found in valuation; but this valuation itself is ever moving forward, ever learning better what should be desired, discovering what in life has immeasurable worth. Religion, to use his term, is marked by a persistent "revaluation of values." He thus makes a purely intellectualist account of religion know its place; yet without abandoning the field to emotion or to primitive instinct or to organic appetite. The book is evolutionary without being ridden by biological habits of estimating facts and methods. The character of religion is found in what it develops out of, but perhaps even more in what it develops into. The importance of the sexual impulse in religion is recognized, but the sources of religion are found by no means exclusively in the sexual life; this impulse is of limited influence, not only in the religious beginnings of the race, but also in personal conversion and in religious leadership. Social influences in religion are recognized, but the significance of the individual is not lost to view. Professor Coe urges the important truth, neglected by those who see in religion only the suppression of the individual by his society, that in religion there is also a giving of freedom to the individual, a grant of strength to oppose his society, to intensify his very individuality.

Yet, with all his moderation in using the very things he likes, Professor Coe seems almost upon occasion overtempted. The idea of function and the social principle come perhaps nearest to being his special weakness. The belief in survival after death, for example, he hardly expects to be greatly affected either by mediumistic phenomena or by experiment; we shall gain assurance if at all, he holds, not because the supposition of such survival would enable us to explain certain observed phenomena, but by the discovery of some common enterprise for both the quick and the dead. He here drives the social interest somewhat hard, and with a lax perception of the use and abuse of the causal principle as a means of discovering reality. It is true that we cannot through causation demonstrate the existence of a single other person. But having once made, perhaps largely on emotional grounds, the great assumption that other minds exist, we satisfy ourselves of the presence of this or that particular mind by noticing facts which call for such a

presence to explain them. When Robinson Crusoe saw footprints on the sand, he did not withhold belief in their obvious meaning until there should arise some common work for the savages and himself. Likewise we believe in the existence of the Neanderthal man because of indubitable signs and though until Doomsday neither we nor he can lend the other a hand at his work. One may be far from inclined to believe that psychic research has proved that the dead yet live, while yet equally far from holding that the enterprise itself is on an almost futile course. If the "researchers" were to get enough of a certain kind of evidence, most of us would believe, even without knowing whether those on the two sides of death could ever labor in common. Professor Coe carries more conviction when he says that the desire to survive is by no means directed solely to *my own* continuance; immortality is desired for others, especially for those we love. It is, however, strange that in a book which makes so much of the "functional" point of view so little should be said of the effect, for good or ill, of the belief or unbelief in immortality.

Indeed here and elsewhere one cannot but feel that the author has been hampered by his own conception of function itself, since he so often finds it close to satisfaction. In seeking the function of various activities in religion, he occasionally tells of their effects in general, but yet he seems primarily interested in a particular group of their effects, namely, the satisfactions they bring. Now it is of course true that conversion, prayer, the belief in immortality, the belief in God, and every other phase of the religious life does satisfy some desire; but the function of these and of religion as a whole may well be far more than this—even as certain subconscious processes may be of great importance functionally, yet of themselves be not satisfying. The task of the psychologist, after he has analyzed and found the causes, is to lay bare all the important consequences, and particularly the psychic consequences, of religion; and in the end he will wish to know in what degree these consequences are satisfying, in what degree they fulfil the deep longings of the spirit. This will be to measure the worth of religion in all its parts and forms. But, first of all, we must discover and describe the effects themselves, regardless of their value, the search being continued with something of that detached and impartial interest with which we seek for causes.

If this be so, there is no gulf fixed between the method which analyzes and causally explains religion, and the method which seeks for the "function"—that is to say, the results—of religion in the entire region of mind. Professor Coe having rightly joined them seems ever to be—if not misjudging their true relation—at least to be obscuring it and to be

exalting the one at the expense of the other. Especially would beginners, one must think, gladly have been spared this overemphasis on the distinction between structure and function. The terms are, for the moment, badges and rallying-cries in psychology; and Professor Coe's colleagues and fellow-workers, as "fans" in the subject, will cheer or hiss each reappearance. But the newcomer, for whom the author is expressly writing, would doubtless prefer—unless he be an odd fish—to give himself more completely to the rich and abundant findings here displayed, and be spared a nudge at every turn lest he forget by which particular tool in psychology the precious thing was unearthed.

Current party enthusiasms thus modify, some will think unfortunately, the even contour of the work; yet none can fail to appreciate the restraint, the accommodation to more established and tested ways of thought. The psychology of religion can well be approached by the book, while the further means of study are indicated by careful bibliographies both of the subject as a whole and of special and important topics.

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RENDEL HARRIS ON THE PROLOGUE OF JOHN

The importance of this book¹ is not to be judged by its modest dimensions. It presents a theory which, if accepted, would profoundly modify our view, not only of the Fourth Gospel, but of New Testament theology as a whole. Mr. Harris maintains that the Prologue to the Gospel was originally a hymn in praise of Wisdom—the substitution of Logos for Sophia being little more than a concession to Hellenistic sentiment. He argues that from the earliest days of the church it was customary to identify Jesus with the divine Wisdom, as portrayed in the eighth chapter of Proverbs. In the lost missionary manual of "Testimonies against the Jews" a central place was given to this Old Testament passage, which henceforth became the *locus classicus* of messianic theory. The Prologue, therefore, has its basis, not in Philonic speculation, but in a theology which had grown up within the church itself. Mr. Harris subjects the language of the Prologue to a detailed examination and lays bare a number of unsuspected coincidences with the eighth chapter of Proverbs. He contends that this chapter, supplemented by kindred passages in

¹ *The Origin of the Prologue to St. John's Gospel.* By Rendel Harris. Cambridge University Press, 1917. vii+66 pages. \$1.25.